INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the Narragansett Indian Tribe ("Tribe")1 created the Narragansett Indian Wetuornuck Housing Authority ("Authority").2
The Authority, which acts on the Tribe's behalf in its housing devel opment and operations, entered into a contract with the Ninigret Development Corporation for the construction of a low-income housing development.3 After construction began, disputes developed over how to proceed with the construction. When conciliation efforts failed, the Authority cancelled the contract.4 The Narragansett Tribal Council, the governing body of the Tribe, followed the forum selection clause5 in the contract and notified the disputants that it would hold a hearing to resolve the dispute.6 Ninigret refused to appear at the hearing, and the Tribal Council found that Ninigret had failed to fulfill its contractual obligations and had incurred liability for the costs to fix the problems encountered in the construction of the housing devel opment.7 Ninigret ignored the Tribal Council's decision and the avail- 3. Id. at 26. The Ninigret Development Corporation is a nontribal entity partially owned by a member of the Narragansett Indian Tribe.
Id.
5. Parties to a contract may choose the forum to hear the dispute by including a forum selection clause in the contract. In Ninigret, the parties agreed that the Narragansett Tribal Council would hear all the disputes. Id.
6. Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 26. A tribal forum -either a tribal court or a tribal council act ing in the capacity of a tribal court -would have had jurisdiction to hear the issues pre sented in the dispute notwithstanding the forum selection clause in the contract. Since con tact with Europeans, many tribes have adopted court systems to facilitate dispute resolution. Courts have also been imposed on tribes through United States legislation. For more infor mation on tribal courts, see generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note l, at 373-418; B.J. 7. Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 26. Although exactly what occurred in the Tribal Council pro ceeding is not clear from the appellate court opinion, whether the Tribal Council entered a default judgement against Ninigret should not matter because federal courts can revisit ju risdictional issues regardless of whether or not a tribal court has made an actual determina tion of its jurisdiction. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text. The ability of federal courts to revisit jurisdictional issues differs from jurisdictional litigation in a state-to-state context, wherein a second state can only revisit the jurisdictional issue if it has not been fully able appeals8 and sued the Authority in federal court for breach of contract.9 The Authority moved to dismiss the claims for want of ju risdiction, claiming that as a tribal agency it was entitled to tribal sov ereign immunity,10 and that the Tribal Council should have jurisdiction in the case pursuant to the exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine ("tribal exhaustion").11 The district court interpreted the forum selec tion clause, ruled the clause enforceable, and dismissed Ninigret's claims because the appellant had failed to follow the provisions of the clause.12 Ninigret appealed. The First Circuit, in Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housin g Authority,13 deter mined that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction by hearing the tribe's sovereign immunity defense and interpreting the forum selection clause before invoking tribal exhaustion.14 The procedural history in Ninigret demonstrates the jurisdictional banter between tribal and federal forums over dispute resolution ac tions involving tribes. In reaction to Ninigret ignoring the Tribal Council's decision and filing suit in federal court, the Authority raised two defenses -tribal sovereign immunity and tribal exhaustion -to clarify the jurisdictional question underlying the federal suit, namely whether the tribe or the federal government had the authority to re solve the dispute. The Authority's invocation of the two defenses, in turn, produced the additional question of how federal courts should 8. Ninigret, 2fJ7 F.3d at 26. The contract provided Ninigret with an appellate procedure following the Tribal Council proceeding, which it ignored. Id.
9.
Id. Even though Ninigret filed six separate claims against the Authority, only the breach of contract claim is discussed here in order to simplify the fact pattern. Id.
10. Black's Law Dictionary broadly defines the doctrine of sovereign immunity as pre cluding a "litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against a sover eign or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents to suit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979). United States courts have acknowledged the sover eign immunity of federal, state, foreign, and tribal governments. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (holding that Indian tribes retain a defense of tribal sovereign immunity); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (establishing a common law defense of sovereign immunity for the federal government); Schooner Exch. v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (extending absolute sovereign immunity to foreign nations).
11. Ninigret, 2fJ7 F.3d at 26, 28. Tribal exhaustion has been defined as the doctrine by which "parties who challenge, under federal law, the jurisdiction of a tribal court to entertain a cause of action must first present their claim to the tribal court before seeking to defeat tribal jurisdiction in any collateral or parallel federal court proceeding." Basil Cook Enters., Inc. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F. 14. 207 F.3d at 35. treat the two defenses when filed simultaneously. The question of how federal courts should treat these two def e nses in determining which government -federal or tribal -retains jurisdiction over the dispute should be resolved in a manner that recognizes the importance of tribal sovereignty and judicial efficiency.
Under federal civil procedure, tribal governments have a range of defenses when sued in federal courts. Tribal governments can file not only standard defenses,15 but as governments, tribes may employ de fenses that are unavailable to non-governmental defendants. In par ticular, the Supreme Court has established the defenses of tribal sov ereign immunity and tribal exhaustion for tribal governments and entities. 16 The defense of tribal sovereign immunity under federal law in fed eral courts ("tribal sovereign immunity")17 stems from the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes and acknowledged by the United States gov ernment.18 The predecessors of the United States government recog nized tribal sovereignty upon initial contact between Indian tribes and European colonists.19 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,20 the Supreme Court distinguished Indian tribes from foreign states while acknowl edging them as separate sovereigns.21 The Court described Indian 15. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
16. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (holding that tribal entities retain tribal sovereign immunity in commercial and governmental transactions both on and off the reservation); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. 845 (1985) ; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 43 6 U.S. 49 (1978) (re affirming the defense of tribal sovereign immunity); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (discussing tribal sovereign immunity). Nontribal defendants may also file the affirmative defense of tribal exhaustion; however, this Note deals specifically with the interplay between the two defenses. The interplay between the two defenses only arises when the defendant is a tribal entity.
17. A distinction exists between tribal sovereign immunity under tribal law in tribal courts and tribal sovereign immunity under federal law in federal courts. See infra Section H.B.
18. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 73 ("The colonists required the creation of legal and political relationships with the tribes in order to legitimate land transactions, trade, and military partnerships with them, exclusive of other European powers. Choosing this method of dealing itself implied recognition of tribes as self-governing peoples.").
19. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-59 (1832). After achieving inde pendence from Great Britain, the United States decided to follow the same government-to government relationship with tribes as fostered by the British government. See Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 29 ("Tribal sovereign immunity 'predates the birth of the Republic.' "). M'lntosh, the Supreme Court held a conveyance made by a tribal chief to a pri vate individual invalid because under the doctrine of discovery only the European sovereign had the rights to acquire land from the natives. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. The Court, in Cherokee Nation, held it did not have jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation's prayer for an injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from enforcing state laws that undermined the tribes as "domestic dependent nations;"22 as such, Indian tribes con tinue to have a government-to-government ·relationship with the United States.23 Through this relationship, Indian tribes retain tribal sovereignty,24 and, as a part of that sovereignty, a defense of sovereign immunity to suits filed against them in federal courts. 25 Tribal sovereign immunity emerged as a doctrine out of federal common law.26 In United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty ability of the Cherokee Nation to govern itself because although the Cherokee Nation was sovereign, it did not qualify as a "foreign state" under Article III of the Constitution. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. The Court affirmed its Cherokee Nation decision in Worcester v. Georgia, holding that the state of Georgia could not pass or enforce laws over Indian lands because the Constitution expressly authorizes only the 'federal government to interact with tribes. 31 U.S. at 557, 561 {explaining that the Court "manifestly consider[ed] the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive.").
22. Worcester, 30 U.S. at 17.
23. 31 U.S. at 557; see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) {re affirming the sovereignty of Indian tribes over their internal affairs). Despite the Supreme Court's early acknowledgment of internal tribal sovereignty, the federal government began to encroach upon tribal sovereignty at the end of the nineteenth century. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest fo r a Decolonized Federal In dian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 97 (1993) {"While the first two hundred and fifty years of colonial expansion certainly had resulted in a Joss of much of the Indian land base to Euro American settlers, it had not deprived the Indians of sovereignty and self-governing author ity over their remaining homelands. Instead, this deprivation resulted·from late nineteenth century legal initiatives, again with the full support of legal theory and the courts."). For most of the twentieth century, federal Indian policy alternated between policies of assimila tion and self-determination. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 140-224. In the 1970s, President Nixon initiated a policy of self-determination for Indian tribes. 26. Sovereign immunity developed in England prior to the colonization of the New World. English Jaw assumed that "the King can do no wrong." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 590 (3d ed. 1999). In transporting the English common Jaw system, the United States adopted the defense of sovereign immunity into its legal system. See CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 590. Federal common law established defenses of sovereign immu nity for the federal government, foreign governments, and Indian tribes. See supra note 10.
The relationships between defenses of sovereign immunity, however, remain unclear. To date, questions arise concerning interstate sovereign immunity. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) for defenses of federal sovereign immunity against tribes, and defenses of state sovereign immunity against tribes. See also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) . Since the early 1990s, the defense of state sovereign immunity against tribes has been in creasingly litigated. In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court decided that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over the tribe's suit against the state of Florida to enforce the In dian Gaming Regulatory Act because Congress did not have the power to waive the state's sovereign immunity through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Id. Thus, defenses of sov ereign immunity continue to be invoked and vigorously enforced against Indian tribes by both state and federal governments. Id.; see also Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 {1991).
Co. ,27 the Supreme Court held that tribes retain a defense of sovereign immunity as part of their retained sovereignty.28 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the defense of sovereign immunity for tribes under federal law in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, holding that Congress did not waive the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit in the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA").29 Further, the Court in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies30 sustained a tribe's sovereign immunity from suit, stating that a tribe's sovereign immunity in federal court ex tends to tribal commercial and governmental activities both on and off the reservation.31
Although Article III of the Constitution grants federal courts sub ject matter jurisdiction in cases involving tribes,32 a sovereign party, such as a tribe, can raise the defense of sovereign immunity to pre clude litigation against it.33 Sovereign parties also may waive the de fense of sovereign immunity. 31. See 523 U.S. at 760 ("Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation."). The sovereign immunity of a tribe under federal law in federal court re flects a theory of absolute sovereign immunity and mirrors the sovereign immunity given to foreign sovereigns prior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The most analogous state law doctrines to exhaustion under federal law are the absten tion doctrines, which contend that state court issues have to be decided before a case can be filed in federal court. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 735. The tribal exhaustion doc trine functions like a state abstention doctrine because it stays the federal court's jurisdiction until after the tribal court has heard and decided the merits of the case. Abstention doctrines are judicially created rules that limit the ability of federal courts to decide issues before them even though the jurisdictional and justiciability requirements have been met. See id. at 735. State abstention doctrines include: Pullman abstention, which "is required when state law is uncertain and a state court's clarification of state law might make a federal court's constitu tional ruling unnecessary," id. at 737, Th ibodaux abstention, which establishes that "federal courts should abstain in diversity cases if there is uncertain state law and an important state interest that is 'intimately involved' with the government's 'sovereign prerogative,' " id. at 752, Burfo rd abstention, which dismisses a case entirely because complex state administra tive procedures completely displace federal court review, id. at 755, and Colorado River ab stention, which provides for abstention to avoid duplicative litigation, id. at 820. Although there is no question that the tribal exhaustion doctrine is functionally similar to state absten tion doctrines, scholars disagree on which state abstention doctrine the tribal exhaustion doctrine most parallels. See Jones, supra note 6, at 490-91; Koehn, supra, at 720-21. This dis agreement, however, merely indicates that the tribal exhaustion doctrine, although function ally similar to state abstention doctrines, does not clearly parallel any of the state doctrines. 565-66 (1981) (holding that a tribe may regulate "the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members ... [and a) tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe"); see also that the plaintiff needed to exhaust its tribal court remedies be fore it could sue in federal court.48 The tribal exhaustion doctrine mandates that when a def endant asserts a colorable claim of tribal court jurisdiction,49 federal courts should give precedence to the tribal courts to determine their own jurisdiction and to hear the case prior to federal court adjudication.50
The Court extended tribal exhaustion in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,51 holding that a federal district court may not exercise diversity jurisdiction over a dispute before an appropriate tribal court first has an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction. The Court in Iowa Mutual indicated that federal courts have limited powers of re view after tribal remedies have been exhausted.52 This limited review of tribal court action by federal courts after tribal exhaustion leaves no federal forum for adjudication on the merits if the tribal court has ju risdiction. 53
Tribal defendants often assert defenses of tribal sovereign immu nity and tribal exhaustion simultaneously, raising the question of which defense federal courts should hear first.54 The Supreme Court Reorganization Act. See Jones, supra note 6, at 470-71. Since 1934, tribal court systems have flourished; almost 150 tribal courts exist today. See Koehn, supra note 44, at 711.
48. Nat'l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56 ("[T)he existence and extent of a tribal court's ju risdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions. We believe that examination should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself."). The Court also held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The Court in National Farmers established three exceptions to tribal exhaus tion. Id. at 856 n.21. According to the Supreme Court, exhaustion is not necessary "where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, when "the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions," and if exhaus tion "would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction. " Id. The Court stated it would preclude tribal exhaustion in cases where a fed eral court could not review the tribe's assertion of its own jurisdiction. It is unclear whether a court has ever refused to apply the tribal exhaustion doctrine for this reason. 50. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d. 21, 31 {1st Cir. 2000) ("The tribal exhaustion doctrine holds that when a colorable claim of tribal court jurisdiction has been asserted, a federal court may (a nd ordinarily should) give the tribal court precedence and afford it a full and fair opportunity to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction over a particular claim or set of claims."). 54. A distinction may be drawn between the kinds of cases in which a tribe raises both defenses. Most often, interplay between the two defenses arises when a question exists as to whether the tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived. Interplay may emerge in other cases as well, particularly when part of the claim may be governed by tribal law rather than federal law.
Cases involving a defense of sovereign immunity may be classified as either "nonwaiver " cases or "waiver " cases. Although some courts implicitly acknowledge this dis tinction, it has not been used explicitly. For instance, addressing the question of whether a tribe waived its sovereign immunity through an arbitration clause, the Supreme Court in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 (2001). indi cated the difference between a waiver and nonwaiver case without expressly classifying the two cases as such. The distinction between waiver and nonwaiver emerged in discussions about whether a waiver occurred. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). In nonwaiver cases, a tribal entity asserts a defense of sovereign immunity and there is no dispute over whether the tribe's defense of sovereign immunity under federal law has been waived either by federal statute, tribal code, or contract. Although the parties may include a forum se lection clause in the contract, and therein specify the law that applies to the contract and the proper forum in which to adjudicate any conflicts arising under the contract, see C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 415-16 (determining that the arbitration clause in the proposed contract specified both the choice of law and the forum for adjudication), more often than not the parties do not specify either a choice of law or a forum for adjudication. See, e.g. , Altheimer has failed to establish with sufficient clarity how to address a case in which the tribal defendants present defenses of both tribal exhaustion and tribal sovereign immunity.55 The order that federal courts hear de fenses of sovereign immunity and tribal exhaustion implicates judicial efficiency and tribal sovereignty, and may determine the outcome of the case.56 Further, courts' divergent invocation of the tribal exhaus tion doctrine has resulted in an uneven application of the two doc trines, allowing for diff ering standards and treatment for similarly situated tribal defendants.57 Thus, the lack of clear direction from the Court, accompanied by the complexity of the federal-Indian relation ship, has left the courts of appeal in disarray.58 & Gray, 983 F.2d at 893; Stock West Corp. , 964 F.2d at 91 2. Further, even when contracts do include such a clause, the forum selection or choice of law clause may not be clear. For in stance, in C & L Enterprises, even though the Supreme Court decided that the provisions of the arbitration and the forum selection clauses were clear, the three courts that heard the case differed in how they interpreted the clauses. 53 2 U.S. at 41 4-420; see also Ninigret Dev. Corp., 2f17 F.3d at 21 . In these cases, the tribe raises both defenses of tribal sovereign immu nity and tribal exhaustion. Tribal exhaustion is normally sought in waiver cases so that the tribe is given the first opportunity to interpret the meaning of the waiver clause. See Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 19 3 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 19 99); Stock West, 964 F.2d at 91 2. Tribal exhaustion, however, may also be sought in nonwaiver cases to resolve tribal law issues that do not pertain to questions of whether tribal sovereign immunity has been waived.
55 . See Reynolds, supra note 44, at 1113-14 (" When the Supreme Court first articulated the tribal exhaustion rule, it provided few hints about when the lower courts should apply it. ... Predictably, the federal courts have disagreed about when to require tribal exhaus tion. ").
56 . In cases where a tribal entity has sovereign immunity, the federal court dismisses the case without prejudice. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1 97 8). The plaintiff can file a suit against a tribe in federal court but sovereign immunity precludes liti gation on the merits and ends the case. Tribal exhaustion merely stays the exercise of the federal court's jurisdiction and adjudication of the question of whether the tribal court has jurisdiction. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1 987). Tribal exhaustion allows the tribal court to determine its own jurisdiction and then for the federal court to re hear the case if necessary. Id. 57 . For instance, when a court applies the tribal exhaustion doctrine in a nonwaiver case, the tribe may have to reappear in federal court to defend on the grounds of its sover eign immunity.
58. Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that plaintiffs need to exhaust their claims in tribal court before a federal court can hear the tribal entity's defense of tribal sov ereign immunity. Davis, 19 3 F.3d 990; Stock West, 964 F.2d 91 2. In Davis, the Eighth Circuit argued that a purported waiver of sovereign immunity by the tribe does not prevent invoca tion of the tribal exhaustion doctrine when the waiver concerns issues of tribal law. See Davis, 19 3 F.3d at 992. The court explained that exhaustion is required because the Supreme Court determined that issues of tribal sovereign immunity are exactly the kind of questions that need to be decided by tribal courts. Id. The Ninth Circuit, in Stock West Corp., con tended that all tribal law issues have to be exhausted in the tribal courts before a federal court can hear a defense of tribal sovereign immunity. Stock West, 964 F.2d at 920. Other circuits have decided the issue differently. The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that the defense of tribal sovereign immunity should be heard before invocation of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. In Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Authority, the First Circuit argued that federal courts should hear defenses of sov ereign immunity first as long as federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists even though the purported waiver in the case identified the tribal council as the mediator of all disputes. 207 This Note will show that, in tribal waiver cases, federal courts should address sovereign immunity first, but conditionally deny sover eign immunity in ambiguous cases and proceed directly to the tribal exhaustion defense. When a federal court finds tribal exhaustion, the case then has to be heard in tribal court before a federal court can re visit the case.59 This allows the tribal court to determine whether or not the tribe has waived its sovereign immunity.
This Note argues that federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity before hearing those of tribal exhaustion. Part I argues that courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first because federal courts treat sovereign immunity like jurisdiction: whereas, most courts treat tribal exhaustion as a matter of comity similar to abstention. Part II proposes a model for hearing tribal de fenses in federal courts. It asserts that the immunity defense should be heard first in both federal and tribal waiver cases. In tribal waiver cases, however, courts should provisionally deny tribal sovereign im munity and proceed to address tribal exhaustion, so that the tribal court can interpret the waiver. This Note concludes that hearing de fenses of tribal sovereign immunity before tribal exhaustion promotes judicial efficiency and tribal sovereignty.
I. COURTS SHOULD HEAR TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY F IRST

BECAUSE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS JURISDICTIONAL
This Part argues that federal court practice supports the hearing of sovereign immunity defenses prior to defenses based on abstention doctrines. Section I.A asserts that because federal courts treat sover eign immunity like jurisdiction, courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first. While general federal rules do not always apply to Indian tribes,64l the nature of the application of tribal sover-F.3d at 29. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in TTEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo dismissed an action against a tribe for an alleged breach of contract on the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity without ever getting to the exhaustion defense. 181 F.3d at 680. In another contract case, Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg . Co., the Seventh Circuit found that the tribe had waived its sovereign immunity and denied application of the tribal exhaustion doctrine because the case did not present any questions of tribal law and the tribe had consented to the jurisdic tion of the Illinois state courts in the letter of intent to contract. 983 F.2d at 812-13.
59. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. , 480 U.S. 9; Nat'I Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) .
60. Because tribes retain sovereignty, general rules set out by the federal courts do not always apply when a tribe or a tribal member is involved. For instance, the Court in Durfe e v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963), explained that a court's jurisdiction cannot be reviewed by another court. Id. at 111, 113 (" From these decisions there emerges the general rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit -even as to questions of jurisdiction -when the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment. ... One trial of an issue is enough. The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Conversely, the Court in eign immunity and tribal exhaustion requires federal courts to follow the general rule of hearing jurisdictional issues, including the defense of sovereign immunity, first. Section I.B argues that the tribal exhaus tion doctrine is not jurisdictional but rather a matter of comity, and thus should be heard second.
A. Courts Treat Defenses of Sovereign Immunity Like Jurisdiction
Federal courts hear jurisdictional questions prior to other ques tions because the Supreme Court decided in Ex Parte McCardle that "[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause."61 Furthermore, federal courts prefer to hear jurisdictional issues first because it is more efficient.62 Although a court can hear a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time,63 courts usually hear these claims as early in the litigation as possible to prevent the expenditure of court time and resources on a case that the court lacks the authority to hear.64
Although federal courts have discretion over the order in which they hear defenses, federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sover eign immunity first because sovereign immunity pertains to the court's jurisdiction.65 While sovereign immunity is not jurisdictional per se, courts under common law practice treat sovereign immunity like juris diction by dealing with it before addressing other issues because sov ereign immunity acts as a bar to the court's exercise of jurisdiction.66 National Farmers Union held that federal courts can review the jurisdiction of tribal courts. 471 U.S. 845 (1987).
61. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868).
62. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) ("[W]e rec ognize that in most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry. In such cases, both expedition and sensitivity to state courts' coequal stature should impel the federal court to dispose of that issue first. Where, as here, however, a district court has be fore it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.") (internal citations omitted). Because immunity defenses preclude the litigation of the case, these defenses go to the jurisdiction of the court and prevent the court from proceeding if the governmental entity has sovereign immunity.67
Courts should address defenses of sovereign immunity prior to other def e nses because courts have defined the nature of sovereign immunity as immunity from process.68 The Supreme Court in Hunter v. Bryant explained that the entitlement to immunity provides for im munity from suit rather than "a mere defense to liability."69 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Tu rner v. United States differentiated between a defense to liability, where the defendant presents a defense to the claims alleged against him, and the defense of tribal sovereign immu nity, which does not require the sovereign to defend the claim, but rather bars the litigation as a whole.70 Under this interpretation, sover eign immunity is not viewed as a defense to liability, but rather pre vents suits against the sovereign entity.71 Because the defense of sov ereign immunity prevents the sovereign from having to defend its action, it functions differently from other defenses which merely ad dress the defendant's liability.72 For instance, while abstention doc trines require a defense and mandate that the parties go through the legal process, sovereign immunity automatically results in the dis missal of the case.73
Sovereign immunity pertains to jurisdiction in that the defense bars the court from exercising its jurisdiction. For example, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court dismissed the question of whether the tribal government violated the ICRA by excluding cer tain individuals from its tribal membership because it determined that Congress had not waived tribal sovereign immunity in the ICRA.74 AI-67. See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Ad ministrative Action: Some Conclusions fr om the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV . 867, 880 (1970) ("[T]his defense [sovereign immunity] goes to the jurisdiction of the court, so that an appellate court will not only refuse to find a 'waiver' in the failure to raise the defense below, but will remedy, sua sponte, the failure to raise it upon appeal, and will dismiss the case, if necessary, over the objections of both parties.") (internal citations omitted). 74. ld. at 59 ("Nothing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief .... In the absence here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit."). After addressing the defense of sovereign immunity asserted by the tribe, the Court though the Court had the subject matter and personal jurisdiction to hear the merits, the Court never reached the merits of the case be cause the tribe's sovereign immunity precluded the litigation.75 Simi larly, in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,7 6 the Court dismissed the company's breach of contract claim because of the tribe's sovereign immunity.
The fact that courts hear def enses of tribal sovereign immunity ei ther prior to or along with other defenses suggests that courts treat immunity defenses like jurisdiction because the merits of the case can not be litigated if the governmental entity has immunity. For instance, the defense of sovereign immunity often arises in cases where a fed eral court has to determine whether or not a tribe is an indispensable party.77 The courts hear def e nses of tribal sovereign immunity in con junction with indispensable party defenses because the court has no jurisdiction if the party has sovereign immunity.78 If courts cannot join an indispensable party because the party has sovereign immunity, the in Santa Clara Pueblo considered whether an officer of the Pueblo was protected by the tribe's sovereign immunity and if the federal court could provide declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. ("As an officer of the Pueblo, petitioner Lucario Padilla is not protected by the tribe's immunity from suit. We must therefore determine whether the cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief asserted here by respondents, though not expressly author ized by the statue, is nonetheless implicit in its terms.") (internal citations omitted).
75. The Court in Santa Clara Pueblo determined that it could not grant declaratory or injunctive relief to the plaintiffs because "the structure of the statutory scheme and the leg islative history of Title I suggest that Congress' failure to provide remedies other than ha beas corpus was a deliberate one." 436 U.S. at 61 . The Court stated "[c]reation of a federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights created in Title I, however useful it might be in securing compliance with § 13 02, plainly would be at odds with the congressional goal of pro tecting tribal self-government." Id. at 64. The Court did not indicate why it heard the tribal sovereign immunity claim first; however, by resolving the issue of tribal sovereign immunity before addressing the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the nonimmune defen dants, the Court suggested the primacy of tribal sovereign i m munity as the first defense to be heard. 78. In Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, the D.C. Circuit decided that the issue of tribal sov ereign immunity had to be heard as a part of determining whether the Delaware Tribe was an indispensable party to be joined under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(l) and 12 (b)(7). See 117 F.3d at 15 03. Similarly in Masayesva v. Zah, the Arizona District Court heard the San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe's defense of tribal sovereign immunity in conjunc tion with its determination of whether the tribe was an indispensable party to the suit. See 792 F. Supp. at 1178. The Arizona District Court explained that the tribe's defense of tribal sovereign immunity was integral to the second part of its analysis of whether the tribe was an indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 . Id. at 1182. The court indicated that it had to hear the defense of tribal sovereign immunity in conjunction with the motion of indispensa ble party in order to determine whether the case could proceed or should be dismissed. Id. at 1182. In Masaysva v. Zah, the court determined that the tribe was an indispensable party, but it could only be joined if it had waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at 11 85. In making the defense of tribal sovereign immunity integral to the indispensable party analysis, the D.C. Circuit and the Arizona District Courts suggest that defenses of tribal sovereign immunity influence the outcomes of cases. · case has to be dismissed.79 Further, federal courts indicate that sover eign immunity relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the case be cause they can raise the issue of sovereign immunity as a bar to the court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte80 and dismiss the case over the objection of both parties if necessary.81 The fact that courts can raise issues of sovereign immunity sua sponte stems from the centrality of jurisdiction to the authority of a court to decide a case; in evaluating whether it has jurisdiction, a court must determine whether one of the parties has sovereign immunity.
Federal courts should treat sovereign immunity as jurisdictional because doing so promotes the efficient use of the court's time and re sources.82 Dismissing cases early in the litigation prevents the court from adjudicating issues over which it lacks authority.83 By not dis missing the case initially, the federal courts act inefficiently and poten tially waste the tribal court's valuable, and limited, resources.84
B. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Is Not Jurisdictional
Section LB explains that tribal sovereign immunity differs signifi cantly from the tribal exhaustion doctrine and therefore provides an other reason why federal courts should consider tribal sovereign im munity prior to tribal exhaustion. First, this Section suggests that tribal exhaustion resembles state abstention doctrines rather than jurisdic tional issues.85 Second, it maintains that tribal exhaustion differs from sovereign immunity in that it developed as a matter of comity, and thus does not pertain to the jurisdiction of the court.
Unlike tribal sover e ign immunity, which is analogous to jurisdic tion, invocation of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is a matter of com ity.86 As a matter of comity, tribal exhaustion is conceptually like the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies but functionally like abstention doctrines. Conceptually tribal exhaustion is like the exhaustion of administrative remedies because both advocate the hearing of the case in another forum before allowing federal court re view .87 The two doctrines, however, differ because the Administrative Procedure Act provides clear guidelines for the levels of review which exist in the exhaustion of administrative remedies;88 no such guidelines exist regarding tribal exhaustion.89 Functionally, the tribal exhaustion doctrine is like state abstention doctrines, which by definition differ from, and are heard subsequent to, jurisdictional issues. 87. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 85, at 409. The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine holds that plaintiffs are not entitled to judicial relief until after they have exhausted all of their administrative remedies. Id. at 406. The exhaustion of administrative remedies also serves many of the same purposes as the tribal exhaustion doctrine. The courts justify the administrative remedies doctrine on the grounds that (1) it gives the agency the first chance to resolve issues in light of its own policies and priorities, (2) it reduces litigation costs and judicial interference into the agency's work, and (3) the exhaustion of administra tive remedies is more efficient than judicial review because the specialization of agencies allows for the streamlining of the adjudication. 92. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 737. trine exists as a matter of comity, fostering mutual respect between federal and tribal courts. 93 Because abstention doctrines developed as a matter of comity, they do not pertain to the ability of the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case.94 Invocation of an abstention doctrine does not preclude a finding of federal court jurisdiction. Rather, once the court has de termined that it has jurisdiction,95 abstention mandates that the federal court either stay or dismiss the federal court proceedings so that the state court can hear the case.96 Similarly, tribal exhaustion requires that "the federal court stay [federal proceedings] in order to give the tribal court a 'full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.' "97 Abstention doctrines allow the federal court to revisit the issues in the case after they have been litigated in the forum to which the federal court deferred.98 Because it is based on comity, the tribal exhaustion defense functions differently than tribal sovereign immunity. Sover eign immunity, like jurisdiction, is a question of whether a court can hear a case; comity, however, merely refers to the deference a court gives to another court by staying the proceedings until the other court decides the issues relevant to the application of its law.99
Courts have not treated tribal exhaustion defenses like jurisdic tion.100 For example, in National Fa rmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe,101 the Supreme Court held that even though the district 93. See Koehn, supra note 44, at 726 ("Exhaustion is required as a matter of comity not as a jurisdictional prerequisite.").
94. See id. at 72 5 ("It is clear from the Court's decisions in National Fa rmers Union and Iowa MU(ual that the tribal exhaustion rule is not jurisdictional .... As a matter of comity, however, the Court declared that the federal courts should slay their hand until the tribal courts had an opportunity to look at the issue."). 99. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 31, at 9 ("Immunity rules, on the other hand, depend on the nature of the relation between the parties involved in the transaction or event, rather than on the relation of either of them to a court."). court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute between a tribe and a non-Indian plaintiff, the plaintiff needed to exhaust its tribal court remedies before it could sue in federal court.102 The Court de termined that courts have to hear all jurisdictional issues prior to invo cation of the tribal exhaustion doctrine.103 Thus, it was only after the Court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction, and that no bars to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction existed, that it invoked the tribal exhaustion doctrine.104 If tribal exhaustion pertained to the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have heard this defense ei ther prior to or along with the other jurisdictional issues raised in the case.105
. See
Federal courts should hear defenses of sovereign immunity prior to tribal exhaustion defenses. Unlike tribal exhaustion, sovereign immu nity pertains to the jurisdiction of the court and its ability to decide the merits of the case, and a finding of sovereign immunity prevents fur ther litigation of the case and conserves court resources.
II. A MODEL FOR HEARING TRIBAL DEFENSES IN FEDERAL COURTS
This Part advances a model for federal courts to use in hearing tribal defenses based on the two types of cases in which the defenses of tribal sovereign immunity and tribal exhaustion arise. These cases include "nonwaiver" cases, in which no question exists as to whether tribal sovereign immunity has been waived, and "waiver" cases, in which a question of whether tribal sovereign immunity has been waived exists. Section II.A contends that federal courts should hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses prior to tribal exhaustion defenses in nonwaiver cases because no question exists as to whether the tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived. Section II.B distinguishes be tween waiver by the federal government and waiver by the tribe. It ar gues that in both cases courts should hear sovereign immunity de fenses first but that, in cases of tribal waiver, courts should conditionally deny the defense of tribal sovereign immunity pending an interpretation by the tribe.
102. Id. at 845.
103. See Nat'/ Fa rmers, 471 U.S. at 857; see also Koehn, supra note 44, at 717 ("As ex pected the Court first addressed the issue of jurisdiction since, of course, the Court needed jurisdiction to hear the merits."). The Supreme Court has not held that sovereign immunity is jurisdictional. The Court has only treated sovereign immunity like jurisdiction; thus, con fusion over the nature of sovereign immunity arises.
104. Nat'/ Fa rmers, 471 U.S. at 849.
105. See supra Section I.A.
A. Non waiver Cases
This Section maintains that federal courts should hear tribal sover eign immunity defenses prior to tribal exhaustion defenses in non waiver cases. It also maintains that hearing sovereign immunity de fenses first protects tribal sovereignty by promoting tribal courts as an appropriate forum for litigation. Finally, this Section argues that hearing sovereign immunity defenses first does not preclude litigants from adjudication on the merits of the case.
In nonwaiver cases, rather than purporting that the tribe waived tribal sovereign immunity, the plaintiff argues that initially the tribe did not have sovereign immunity.106 For instance, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. is a straightforward nonwaiver case because the plaintiff argued not that the tribe's sovereign immunity had been waived either through congressional or tribal action,107 but that the tribe did not retain tribal sovereign immunity under the facts specific to the case.108 Because the Supreme Court determined that the Kiowa Tribe had sovereign immunity, the Court dismissed the case without hearing any further defenses or claims.109 Hearing tribal sov ereign immunity defenses first in nonwaiver cases not only is consis tent with current federal court procedure but also ensures judicial effi ciency and does not impede upon tribal sovereignty. Courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first in nonwaiver cases be cause it promotes judicial efficiency by making productive use of judi cial resources and preventing unnecessary litigation.
As discussed in Section l.B, federal courts should hear sovereign immunity defenses prior to tribal exhaustion def enses in nonwaiver cases because hearing sovereign immunity defenses first promotes ju dicial efficiency.110 This is particularly true in nonwaiver cases. Federal courts act most efficiently when they hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses first because it allows them to dismiss the case upon finding that the tribe has sovereign immunity.111 This prevents the court from 108. Manufacturing Technologies did not argue that the tribe had waived its tribal sov· ereign immunity but that tribal sovereign immunity did not exist in the first place because tribal sovereign immunity did not extend to the tribe in business transactions occurring off the reservation. Id. at 753. The Court rejected this claim, holding that tribal sovereign im· munity does extend to commercial transactions entered into by a tribe off its reservation. Id. at 760.
Id.
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. Dismissing a case in which the tribal sovereign immunity is clear, as the Court did in Kiowa Tribe, prevents the unnecessary and prolonged litigation that could occur if courts heard exhaustion defenses before sovereign immunity defenses. When exhaustion defenses are heard first, the possibility exists that after tribal court proceedings the case will return to federal court. Thus, requiring exhaustion without addressing the tribe's sovereign immunity engaging in unnecessary litigation and saves the federal courts and tribal defendants time and resources.112
Even though some circuits advocate the hearing of tribal exhaus tion defenses prior to tribal sovereign immunity defenses in order to protect and strengthen tribal courts, the hearing of sovereign immu nity defenses first does not undermine the existence and activity of tribal courts.113 Some circuits argue that federal courts should hear tribal exhaustion first because this promotes tribal court development by allowing the tribe to determine its own jurisdiction in the first in stance.114 This position, while admirable, ignores the fact that in these cases tribal courts may have jurisdiction to hear the case regardless of whether a federal court has jurisdiction or grants an abstention through the tribal exhaustion doctrine.115 Because the tribal court's ju risdiction over the case is independent of that of the federal court, the federal court does not have to require tribal exhaustion for the tribal court to have jurisdiction unless one of the parties challenges the tribal court's jurisdiction.116 Thus, even if a federal court does not hear tribal exhaustion first, tribal courts still have jurisdiction. Furthermore, the existence of tribal court jurisdiction even when a federal court has not ordered tribal exhaustion promotes tribal court jurisdiction, because the tribal court exists as a forum in which the plaintiff can bring suit even if no federal forum has jurisdiction. 117 The ability of plaintiffs to sue in tribal court not only provides the litigant with an appropriate forum for adjudication but also strength ens the tribal court system. When a f e deral court finds sovereign im munity, the tribal court becomes the only forum in which the plaintiff could lead to a full adjudication in tribal court followed by proceedings in the federal courts in which the federal court then determines whether the tribe had tribal sovereign immunity. By dismissing the case, hearing defenses of sovereign immunity first conserves the resources of both federal and tribal courts. 117. For example, in Santa Clara Pueblo, the plaintiff could seek a tribal remedy even though the federal court decided that it could not exercise its jurisdiction due to tribal sover eign immunity. 436 U.S. 49. may seek relief.118 The lack of federal court jurisdiction provides tribal courts with more opportunities to develop their own jurisprudence be cause they are the only fora able to hear the merits of the case. Al though some commentators and plaintiffs suggest that tribal courts are biased,119 federal courts have acknowledged the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts as providing claimants with an appropriate forum for the adj udication of claims.120 Thus, dismissing nonwaiver cases on sov ereign immunity grounds does not deny the plaintiff a forum f o r adj u dication, because the plaintiff may be able to sue the tribe in tribal court.121
Tribal sovereign immunity does not deprive litigants of a forum because hearing a defense of tribal sovereign immunity prior to a tribal exhaustion defense merely dismisses the federal court case; thus, it does not affect the ability of the litigant to sue in tribal court. The dismissal of a case in federal court due to a finding of tribal sovereign immunity in the federal courts does not preclude litigation in tribal court because the tribe may not have tribal sovereign immunity in tribal court.122 A tribe may in fact have sovereign immunity under fed-118. State courts do not have independent civil jurisdiction over most cases arising in Indian country. For more information on state, federal, and tribal jurisdiction, see GETCHES ET AL., supra note l, at 520, 635-43. Moreover, state court bias does not necessitate federal court jurisdiction. For instance, no matter how biased a state court may be, a case can only be heard in federal court if it meets the requirements for federal court jurisdiction. See GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 1, at 641-43.
120. See, e.g., Santa Clara 'Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65 (" Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums f or the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting impor tant personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians."). 122. In Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the court explained that a waiver of sovereign immunity in one court does not imply a waiver of sov ereign immunity in another court. Id. at 1574 ("That the Government has waived its immu nity in the Court of Federal Claims does not imply that the Government has waived its im munity in other courts."). Just as the federal government can waive sovereign immunity in one court but not another, in the tribal law context, it is entirely possible that a tribe would have sovereign immunity under federal law but not in tribal court. Tribal codes, such as the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Code, may provide for waivers of tribal sovereign immunity under tribal law but not federal law.
eral law, but not under tribal law because the tribe may have waived its sovereign immunity under tribal law either through a tribal code or contract.123 Thus, if the federal court dismisses the case, the plaintiff can still pursue the case in tribal court.124
Federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first in nonwaiver cases. Hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immu nity first prevents the inefficient use of court resources. Further, this order does not infringe on tribal sovereignty. Finally, hearing sover eign immunity defenses first does not preclude the litigants from hav ing their claims heard by an appropriate forum.
B. Waiver Cases
This Section argues that in both kinds of waiver cases, federal courts should hear sovereign immunity defenses first. This Section, however, goes on to assert that federal courts should provisionally deny sovereign immunity in tribal waiver cases, and should then in voke the tribal exhaustion doctrine so that the tribal court can deter mine its own jurisdiction in the case and interpret the waiver in ques tion.
Federal Waiver
Federal courts should hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses first because federal waiver cases do not present questions of tribal law. For example, Santa Clara Pueblo is a federal waiver case because the question of waiver is controlled by an interpretation of federal law.125 The issue in Santa Clara Pueblo was whether Congress waived the tribe's sovereign immunity under federal law through the ICRA.126 The Court decided that Congress had not waived the tribe's sovereign immunity through the ICRA and then dismissed the case against the tribe.127 If in federal waiver cases federal courts hear and invoke tribal exhaustion first, tribal courts would be required to interpret f ederal law. Even though tribal courts can interpret federal law,128 federal courts are better equipped to hear claims under federal law than tribal courts.129 Tribal courts do not have as much experience in the applica-123. See, e.g., Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee Nation, 972 F.2d 11 66, 1171 (1 0th Cir. 1992) (" When read together, the contract clauses are at best ambiguous regarding sovereign im munity in any court except tribal court.").
124. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65 . 12 5. Namely, the Indian Civil Rights Act. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59 , 61-64.
126. Id. at 59 .
127. Id. at 59 .
128. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 52 6 U.S. 473, 48 5 n.7 (1999).
129. See infra Section 11.B.2. tion of federal law as federal courts do.130 Further, having multiple tribal courts interpret federal law could lead to inconsistent applica tion of the law.131 Because the issue of waiver in these cases falls under federal rather than tribal law, tribal exhaustion should not be required in federal waiver cases.
Hearing tribal sovereign immunity defenses first in federal waiver cases, as in nonwaiver cases, promotes judicial efficiency.132 As men tioned above, hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first en sures the efficient use of court resources by preventing the relitigation of the case in federal court after full tribal court proceedings.133 In fed eral waiver cases, the application of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is especially inefficient because tribal court interpretation of federal law provides the federal courts with an additional reason to review the tribal court's assertion of its jurisdiction.134 The federal court could de cide to review the tribal court decision to determine whether the tribe correctly interpreted federal law.135 Thus, hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first in federal waiver cases is more efficient than hearing tribal exhaustion defenses first.
Federal courts should hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses prior to tribal exhaustion defenses in federal waiver cases because it promotes tribal sovereignty. Because sovereign immunity acts as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction, hearing sovereign immunity defenses first and dismissing cases in which the tribe has sovereign immunity advances tribal sovereignty by keeping tribal defendants out of federal court.136 Further, the dismissal of a case in federal court advocates the increased use of tribal courts because it encourages litigants to pursue any remedies open to them in tribal court.
Tribal Waiver
This Section argues that in tribal waiver cases defenses of tribal sovereign immunity should be addressed first, for many of the same 130. Justice Brennan's argument that permitting state courts to interpret federal law leads to inconsistent and incorrect applications of federal law can also be extended to tribal courts. See Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 828 (1 986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (" [T] he possibility that the federal law will be incorrectly interpreted in the con text of adjudicating the state law claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal questions.").
Id.
132. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.
134. This area of the law (federal review of tribal court decisions) remains unclear and federal courts may think they have more of a reason to review tribal court cases if tribal courts are interpreting federal law.
135. See Merrill Dow Pharm., 478 U. S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra Part I.
reasons that federal courts should hear sovereign immunity defenses first in federal waiver cases. In tribal waiver cases, however, the ques tion of whether or not the tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived is one of tribal law. The Section asserts that in tribal waiver cases fed eral courts should conditionally deny the tribe's defense of sovereign immunity and proceed directly to the question of tribal exhaustion. This enables the tribe to interpret the waiver clause under tribal law.137
In the course of its consideration of a tribe's defense of tribal sov ereign immunity, a federal court must determine the nature of the waiver. If the waiver is one that purportedly occurred under tribal law, the federal court should not address it. Instead, the court should con ditionally deny the defense, which would give it the authority to in voke the tribe's exhaustion defense.138 The court could then stay pro ceedings and mandate that the plaintiff return to tribal court. After the tribal court proceedings, the federal court could revisit the ques tion of waiver if necessary, and would have the benefit of the tribal re cord to inform its determination.139 This procedure will preserve tribal sovereignty, promote the development of tribal courts, and ensure that plaintiffs retain the opportunity to request federal court review.140
A conditional denial promotes the three purposes underlying the creation of the tribal exhaustion defense: (1) to promote Congress' policy of tribal self-determination, (2) to practice judicial efficiency, and (3) to facilitate the expertise of tribal courts.141 Since the 1970s, the 137. By granting a conditional denial of tribal sovereign immunity, the federal court could reconsider its denial after the tribal court proceedings. In this sense, the conditional denial functions like Pullman abstention, which requires a federal court to stay proceedings "when state law is uncertain and a state court's clarification of the state law might make a federal court's constitutional ruling unnecessary." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 737; see also R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) . After the court stays its pro ceedings and the state court decides the uncertain question of state law, the matter may re turn to federal court for a decision on the constitutional issue if necessary. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 738.
138. The federal court, however, cannot invoke exhaustion without determining whether it has jurisdiction, and thus, it should address the sovereign immunity defense first. Because the federal court needs jurisdiction to reach exhaustion, a conditional denial of the sovereign immunity defense allows the court to require exhaustion so that it can benefit from the record developed in the tribal court proceeding.
139. The federal court should hear issues of tribal sovereign immunity and allow the tribal court to decide issues of tribal sovereign immunity first because the !ribal court's in terpretation of the waiver clause under tribal law will inform the federal court as to whether it has jurisdiction over the case. United States Congress has developed a policy of tribal self determination.142 Congress is concerned with protecting Indian tribes because they remain dependent domestic sovereigns within the United States.143 Conversely, Congress is not concerned with protecting the laws of an entirely separate sovereign because, as an independent sov ereign, it can protect its own laws.144 The congressional concern for tribal law follows the fiduciary relationship that has developed be tween the tribes and the United States.145 Because tribes are consid ered domestic dependent nations within the United States, the United States has a duty to protect their existence and development.146
Federal courts act contrary to congressional policy by ignoring the distinction between tribal and federal waivers in interpreting waivers of tribal sovereign immunity. As a result, they undermine tribal law and the tribal courts.147 When federal courts ignore the distinction be tween tribal waivers and federal waivers, they blur the distinction be tween federal and tribal law and apply federal law in cases where the tribal court should be able to review the case in the first instance.148 148. The court in Ninigret blurred the distinction between tribal and federal law by in sisting that the question of tribal sovereign immunity was as much a question of federal law as it was of tribal law. Id. at 29 n.5 ("Principles of comity strongly suggest that the tribal court be allowed to determine, in the first instance, the scope of its own jurisdiction, whereas the issue of whether a suit may be brought against a tribe at all, in any forum, is of equal in terest to the federal and tribal courts.'').
Wetuomuck Housing Authority,149 the First Circuit insisted that tribal sovereign immunity is a question of federal law rather than tribal law because it viewed tribes -and presumably tribal law -as subject to absolute congressional control.150 The First Circuit argued that subject matter jurisdiction enables f e deral courts to interpret waivers of tribal sovereign immunity regardless of the law -tribal or federal -gov erning the waiver.151 The court thus used subject matter jurisdiction to subsume Congress' absolute control over tribal sovereignty. In allow ing f ederal rather than tribal courts to determine the question of waiver, the court made the application of the tribal exhaustion doc trine completely irrelevant to the question of waiver,152 and, moreover, ignored Congress' stated policy preferring the development of tribal courts.
The Supreme Court has ruled that Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes.153 When federal courts ignore stated congressional policy regarding tribes, they undermine that plenary power.154 Such 152. Id. The Nihigret court interpreted the waiver and then invoked tribal exhaustion on other issues because it determined that congressional plenary power over tribes allowed the court to read tribal sovereign immunity as a matter of federal rather than tribal law. This interpretation of plenary power made the issue of tribal exhaustion irrelevant to the ques tion of waiver by assuming that federal law rather than tribal law controlled the question of waiver. Id. ("[T]his conclusion flows naturally from the reality that the sovereignty of Indian tribes is subject to congressional control, with the result that tribal sovereign immunity is necessarily a matter of federal law."). 154. Here, the First Circuit focused on the plenary power claimed by Congress over Indian tribes while ignoring Congress's use of its own power to promote the development of tribal courts and tribal sovereignty. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit claimed to draw a distinc tion between fe deral and tribal law but failed to address how this distinction could interplay with questions of waiver. Rather, in determining that the tribe had waived its sovereign im munity, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the tribal code provisions dealing with tribal sover eign immunity. Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 1993) ("SMC points to Sections 2-2-103 and 10-4-106 of the Sioux's Tribal Law and Order Code ... which reserve sovereign status and immunity for tribal entities .... The Tribe, it self, by passing Section 10-4-106(1) of the Code, provides that sovereign immunity may be limited by a tribal entity's charter."). _The Seventh Circuit did not apply the tribal exhaustion doctrine even after dismissing tribal sovereign immunity because it said there were no issues of tribal law. Id. at 814 ("Here, there has been no direct attack on a tribal court's jurisdic tion, there is no case pending in tribal court, and the dispute does not concern a tribal ordi-disregard for congressional policy places the courts in potential con flict with Congress and raises serious separation of powers concerns.155
In order to avoid such conflicts, federal courts should refrain from taking action that undermines the ability of tribal courts to hear tribal law issues.
Not hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first not only places the judiciary in direct conflict with the congressional policy of tribal self-determination, but also threatens the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship between tribes and the United States government.156 The longstanding sovereign-to-sovereign relationship between the United States government and Indian tribes exists in a vast body of codified federal law.157 The defense of sovereign immunity developed out of re spect for separate sovereigns and this respect extends to tribal sover eigns as well.158 Although federal courts can certainly apply f o reign law, and arguably tribal law is analogous to foreign law, congressional policy distinguishes the application of tribal law from simple choice of law doctrine.159 Congress has not developed a policy protecting or en couraging the development of foreign courts, nor has it established a fiduciary relationship with foreign governments.160 Federal courts that ignore the distinction between federal and tribal law undermine this established fiduciary sovereign-to-sovereign relationship.
Federal courts should be able to grant conditional denials of tribal · sovereign immunity and allow for the renewal of the defense of tribal nance as much as it does state and federal law."). The Seventh Circuit, however, only main tained that there were no issues of tribal law because it failed to consider the interpretation of the tribal code as a tribal Jaw issue. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit, like the First Circuit, failed to grant tribal courts comity and thus, undermined the congressional policy of advocating tribal courts. sovereign immunity in federal court in order to ensure judicial effi ciency and prevent unnecessary litigation .. This would resemble the Court's decision in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co. , Inc., which affirmed the conditional denial procedures under Rule 50( c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and explained the flexibility in herent in the interplay between motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.161 In Neely, the Court considered whether a Court of Appeals can order a dismissal or direct entry of judgment for the defendant after reversing the denial of a defendant's Rule 50{b) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.162 The Court held that a Court of Appeals can order a dismissal because not allowing a court to order a dismissal would undermine the efficiency goal of Rule 50, which serves to prevent unnecessary retrials.163 As in Neely, unnec essary litigation will be prevented by allowing the federal court to make an informed decision on the question of tribal sovereign immu nity .164 A conditional denial prevents unnecessary litigation because the tribal court develops a record on the question of the waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for the federal court to review in determin ing whether it has jurisdiction.165 The tribal court record may clarify the tribal sovereign immunity issue. Thus, the federal court can dis miss the case without engaging in further litigation.
Although cases do not necessarily return to the federal courts after tribal adjudication, if one does and is dismissed f o r lack of jurisdic tion, 166 then allowing federal courts to conditionally deny claims to 161. 386 U.S. 317 (1967). Rule 50 gives courts a wide range of flexibility in addressing whether a judgment as a matter of law should be granted. To begin with, parties to a case can raise a motion for a judgment as a matter of law on several occasions throughout the trial. RICHARD B. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 583 (2d ed. 1995). If a movant's original motion under Rule 50 is denied by the court, the party can re new the motion at a latter stage in the trial, usually after all of the evidence has been pre sented. Id. at 584. The ability to renew the motion allows the court to seek more information prior to granting a judgment as a matter of law.
162. 386 U.S. at 317.
163. 386 U.S. at 326 ("But these considerations do not justify an ironclad rule that the court of appeals should never order dismissal or judgment for defendant when the plaintiff's verdict has been set aside on appeal. Such a rule would not serve the purpose of Rule 50 to speed litigation and to avoid unnecessary retrial. Nor do any of our cases mandate such a rule."). The main difference between the ability to renew a judgment as a matter of law and a condi tional denial of sovereign immunity pending tribal court adjudication would be that in the latter, the information the federal court was seeking would come not from continuance of the case in federal court, but from the expertise of another adjudicatory body, namely the tribal court.
166. For instance, after the federal court conditionally denies tribal sovereign immunity and invokes tribal exhaustion, the case has to be heard in tribal court before the federal court will rehear the issues in the case. Once the tribal court hears the case and all potential tribal remedies are exhausted, then the plaintiff can challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction tribal sovereign immunity appears to undercut the efficiency achieved by the general rule of hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first. Federal courts apply both foreign and state law regularly167 so litigants could argue that the conditional denial further undermines efficiency by prolonging litigation in cases when the federal court could just apply tribal law.168 The efficiency goal, however, would not be undermined by a conditional denial because federal courts would only grant conditional denials in tribal waiver cases. Federal courts would still dismiss cases on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity in cases where questions of waiver did not exist.169 Further, allowing the tribal court to develop a record on the question of the waiver would actually encourage administrative efficiency by promoting the orderly administration of justice.170
Federal courts should grant conditional denials of tribal sovereign immunity pending tribal court interpretation in tribal waiver cases be cause tribal exhaustion .provides federal courts with a tribal court rec ord which will inform the federal court's analysis of the waiver ques tion.171 For example, in cases where no forum selection or choice of law provision unambiguously delegates jurisdiction to a particular court or jurisdiction, the law that pertains to the contract remains un clear.172 In these cases, standard choice of law analysis indicates that in federal court. At this point, the federal court could decide that the tribe retains tribal sov ereign immunity under federal law and dismiss the case. See supra note 98 and accompany ing text.
167. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 82-89.
168. For instance, federal courts apply substantive state law in diversity jurisdiction pro ceedings. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) . For more information on the Erie Doctrine, see CURRIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 651-704. [T] he risks of the kind of 'procedural nightmare' that has allegedly de veloped in this case will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it may have made. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will ... also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial re view.").
See supra
171. See, e.g., Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d at 27-29 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000); Stock West, 964 F.2d at 919. Ambiguous waiver cases are cases in which it is not clear that the provisions of the contract waive the tribe's sovereign immunity. The federal courts have held repeatedly that a tribe only waives its sovereign im munity if the waiver is clear and explicit. See, e.g. , Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). The Supreme Court has explained that C & L Enterprises is an example of a clear waiver case. In contrast, Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee Nation, 972 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1992), is an example of an ambiguous waiver case. See id. at 1171 ("When read together, the contract clauses are at best ambiguous regarding sovereign immunity in any court except tribal court. We hold that the contract provisions do not reach the high threshold required by Santa Clara Pueblo for clear expression of the Nation's waiver of sovereign immunity.").
172. A forum selection or choice of law provision within the contract does not ensure that the applicable law is clear. See, e.g. , Bank of Okla. , 972 F.2d at 1171. tribal law most likely would apply.173 Thus, f e deral courts should grant a conditional denial of tribal sovereign immunity, which allows for a reconsideration of the tribal sovereign immunity defense after tribal adjudication that is informed by the tribal record.
Federal courts should conditionally deny tribal sovereign immunity defenses in tribal waiver cases because federal courts prefer not to in terpret tribal law.174 Not only do f e deral courts resist having to apply foreign law in general,175 but federal courts are particularly wary of applying tribal law because they argue that tribal courts present a bet ter forum for deciding issues of tribal law .176 Some federal courts have asserted that the federal courts are not competent to decide matters of tribal law and that for them to do so undermines notions of tribal federal comity.177 Federal courts also hesitate to apply tribal law be cause it impedes upon the dignity and autonomy of the tribe, which in most cases could easily apply its own law.178 Allowing federal courts to apply tribal law could also lead to inconsistent interpretation and ap plication of the law. Some federal courts observe this concern by maintaining that they should not hear tribal law issues because tribes and tribal laws retain "unique ethnic and cultural patterns" that may be misapplied or misinterpreted by other courts.179 This argument un derlies the long-standing federal court recognition of "the exclusive responsibility of Native American tribes to construe their own law."180 Finally, the fact that federal courts prefer not to apply tribal law is evidenced by the very existence of the tribal exhaustion doctrine.
Further, even though federal courts can interpret tribal, state, and foreign law, federal courts should hear defenses of sovereign immunity first and allow for tribal exhaustion in tribal waiver cases because tribal courts are better at interpreting tribal law than federal courts.
Just as state courts are more experi at applying state law than federal courts are,181 the expertise of tribal courts ensures that they are better at applying tribal law.182 Several federal courts have recognized that tribal courts are better at applying tribal law than they are.183 In advo cating the hearing of tribal exhaustion defenses first, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the need for tribal courts to interpret tribal law in the first instance.184 The expertise of tribal courts also underlies the purpose of the tribal exhaustion doctrine,185 and has long been recognized by both Congress and the judiciary of the United States.186 Further, tribal law differs from both state and foreign law, which federal courts interpret regularly .187
In tribal waiver cases, federal courts should follow the general rule of hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first but grant condi tional denials of tribal sovereign immunity, pending tribal court inter pretation of the waiver clause. Federal courts should grant conditional denials and invoke tribal exhaustion because this remains consistent with the federal court practice of hearing jurisdictional issues first. Second, the granting of the conditional denial remains consistent with Congress' policy of self-determination for Indian tribes. The condi tional denial also promotes the efficient use of federal and tribal court resources. Further, granting a conditional denial allows tribal courts to hear tribal law issues. Not only are tribal courts better at resolving is sues of tribal law, but allowing tribal courts to hear tribal law issues promotes tribal sovereignty. The use of a conditional denial also al lows for tribal courts to develop a record on the case to facilitate fed eral court proceedings. 
CONCLUSION
Generally, federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity prior to tribal exhaustion defenses because this remains con sistent with federal court procedure, promotes judicial efficiency, and does not impede upon tribal sovereignty. Defenses of tribal sovereign immunity should be heard first because the federal courts treat immu nity questions like jurisdictional issues. Further, the federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first in nonwaiver cases because no question exists as to whether the tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived. Thus, by hearing defenses of tribal sover eign immunity first, federal courts· can easily dismiss nonwaiver cases and save judicial resources.
Federal courts should also hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses first in waiver cases. In federal waiver cases, hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first allows the federal court to determine waiver questions arising under federal law and dismiss such cases when the tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived by Congress. In tribal waiver cases, federal courts should still hear defenses of tribal sover eign immunity first; however, they should conditionally grant denials of tribal sovereign immunity, pending tribal court adjudication, in or der to ensure that tribal courts have the first opportunity to interpret tribal law. Allowing tribal courts to do so prevents the inefficient use of judicial resources, promotes tribal sovereignty and the development of tribal courts, and develops a record to inform further federal court proceedings.
